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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article examines an infrequently considered question in the 
literature about federal jurisdiction: whether Congress is subject to any 
constitutional constraint when it consents to being sued in federal court.  
Even assuming that the sovereign’s consent is a necessary condition to 
suit in federal court, this article argues that the waiver of immunity cannot 
confer jurisdiction in a manner or through a process that circumvents 
constitutional requirements.  This question, narrow but important, has not 
received sustained attention in the otherwise voluminous literature on 
Congress’s power to regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
1
  Most 
discussion engages with the problem of whether Congress can strip the 
courts of jurisdiction to hear particular kinds of claims or, having 
conferred jurisdiction, to withhold power to issue specific remedies.
2
  A 
small sub-set of the literature distinguishes between jurisdictional 
regulation and waivers of immunity.
3
  The current focus is on an 
immunity-waiver that confers jurisdiction to resolve tort claims against 
the United States, but then withholds jurisdiction and extinguishes such 
claims on unconstitutional grounds—a problem that implicates not only 
individual rights but also the decisional independence of the Article III 
courts.
4
 
 
1 See Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and 
Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 549 (2003) (referring to the “vast” 
debate about Congress’s power to control Article III jurisdiction).  
2 See Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial 
Decision-Making, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 191–92 (2001) (distinguishing the literature 
about “jurisdiction-stripping” statutes from that concerning statutes regulating how federal 
courts exercise jurisdiction).  Additionally, commentators consider whether Congress 
constitutionally may assign the adjudication of claims to non-Article III decision makers.  See, 
e.g., Paul Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts 
Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233 (1990) (discussing the constitutionality of Article I 
tribunals).  
3 See Gordon G. Young, Congressional Regulation of Federal Courts’ Jurisdiction and 
Processes: United States v. Klein Revisited, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 1189, 1224–33 (1991) 
(discussing the scope of the waiver-immunity as distinct from a statute regulating federal 
jurisdiction); see also Sarah L. Brinton, Three Dimensional Sovereign Immunity, 54 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 239 (2014) (developing the position that Congress’s Waiver Power is neither 
unilateral nor unreviewable and criticizing the notion of “exclusive congressional waiver”); 
Jason Wojciechowski, Federalism Limits on Article III Jurisdiction, 88 NEB. L. REV. 288 
(2009) (“structural limitations on the extent of congressional power [with respect to state 
sovereign immunity] should be treated as limitations on the scope of the federal courts’ 
jurisdiction”). 
4 Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political 
Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697, 699 (1995) (discussing the term “decisional 
independence”). 
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The jumping off point for the discussion is the 2014 decision of the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Jackson v. United States,
5
 which arose 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).
6
  The FTCA waives the 
government’s sovereign immunity and confers jurisdiction on Article III 
courts to hear tort claims against the United States.  The statute’s grant of 
jurisdiction does not provide immediate access to federal court.  Instead, 
the potential plaintiff must first exhaust administrative remedies and 
attempt to settle her claim with the agency whose employees are 
implicated in the government’s alleged misconduct.
7
  If the agency denies 
the claim, the tort victim may then file a federal action, and the suit must 
be commenced within six months of the agency’s denial.
8
  In Jackson, the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the agency’s mailing of a denial 
letter was sufficient to trigger the filing period under the FTCA, despite 
the fact that the claimant never received any notice of the government’s 
decision because the letter, sent by certified mail to the claimant’s lawyer, 
was returned to the agency as undeliverable and the agency took no 
follow-up steps—even though the case file contained the claimant’s 
current mailing address and regulations authorize the agency to give 
notice of the denial directly to the claimant.
9
  Because the plaintiff filed 
her federal complaint more than six months after the agency’s mailing of 
the denial letter, the court considered the suit to be untimely; moreover, 
the court treated the limitations period as a condition of the government’s 
 
5 Jackson v. United States, 751 F.3d 712 (6th Cir. 2014), rehearing denied, No. 13-1243, 
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13779 (6th Cir. July 2, 2014). 
6 Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, Title IV, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (current version codified 
in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2012) (jurisdiction conferred), § 2401(b) 
(jurisdiction exclusions), §§ 2671–2680 (administrative exhaustion)); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) 
(conferring “exclusive jurisdiction” on the federal district courts “for injury . . . caused by the 
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within 
the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a 
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where 
the act or omission occurred”); see Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort 
Compensation Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 4563 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (abrogating Westfall 
v. Ervin, 484 U.S. 292 (1988)).  
7 See generally George A. Bermann, Federal Tort Claims at the Agency Level: The FTCA 
Administrative Process, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 509 (1985) (describing the administrative-
exhaustion process under the 1966 amendment to the FTCA). 
8 See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).  
9 See Jackson, 751 F.3d at 717 (stating that “the FTCA does not require that the claimant 
receive the denial letter in order to commence the six-month limitation period”); 28 C.F.R. 
14.9 (2014) (“Final denial of an administrative claim shall be in writing and sent to the 
claimant, his attorney, or legal representative by certified or registered mail.”). 
HELEN HERSHKOFF.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/3/2015  3:47 PM 
246 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 39:2 
waiver of immunity and so refused to permit equitable tolling.
10
  Thus, 
the court dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the 
plaintiff was barred “forever” from securing judicial relief.
11
 
The approach in Jackson is typical of many FTCA decisions: the 
appeals court started from the premise that because the jurisdiction of the 
district court depends upon the government’s waiving immunity to suit, 
the procedural conditions attached to that waiver are jurisdictional and 
require strict enforcement.
12
  This interpretation of the FTCA developed 
before the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the distinction between 
jurisdictional and claim-processing rules.
13
  It seems unlikely that the 
statute’s procedures governing administrative exhaustion are 
jurisdictional in the relevant sense given the location of the filing-period 
procedure in the statute’s text and its functional significance to an 
agency’s resolution of a claim.
14
  The correct approach would be to treat 
the six-month filing period as an affirmative defense, and not as a 
jurisdictional condition.
15
  Moreover, the court of appeals’ reliance on a 
strict-construction rule to enforce the filing-period seems at odds with the 
Supreme Court’s current view that strict construction extends only to the 
 
10 Jackson, 751 F.3d at 717–18 (tolling not permitted because limitations period is 
jurisdictional). 
11 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (providing that a tort claim shall be “forever barred”).  
12 See, e.g., Vacek v. U.S. Postal Serv., 447 F. 3d 1248 (9th Cir. 2006) (applying rule of 
strict construction to conditions of administrative exhaustion and dismissing suit as time-
barred and jurisdictionally deficient); see Richard Parker, Is the Doctrine of Equitable Tolling 
Applicable to the Limitations Periods in the Federal Tort Claims Act?, 135 MIL. L. REV. 1 
(1992).  
13 See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012) (“This Court has endeavored in 
recent years to ‘bring some discipline’ to the use of the term ‘jurisdictional.’  Recognizing our 
‘less than meticulous’ use of the term in the past, we have pressed a stricter distinction 
between truly jurisdictional rules, which govern ‘a court’s adjudicatory authority,’ and 
nonjurisdictional ‘claim-processing rules,’ which do not.”) (citations omitted).  The Court has 
granted certiorari in a pair of FTCA cases concerning the availability of equitable tolling of 
the time periods to file administrative claims and to file federal lawsuits.  See June v. United 
States, 550 F. App’x 505 (9th Cir. 2013) (administrative claims); Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d 
1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (lawsuits).   The author’s position is that the time periods are 
classic claims-processing provisions and not jurisdictional, so equitable tolling ought to be 
available.  See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130 (2007).  However, 
even if the Court treats the provision as jurisdictional, the government’s waiver of immunity 
would still be subject to constitutional constraints as argued in this article. 
14 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012) (“United States as defendant . . . [t]he district courts 
shall have original jurisdiction . . .”), with 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (“Time for commencing action 
against United States”).    
15 See, e.g., Schmidt v. United States, 933 F.2d 639 (8th Cir. 1991) (treating condition as 
affirmative defense and not as jurisdictional requirement). 
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“core” question of whether immunity is expressly waived.
16
  As Justice 
Scalia explained in his 2012 book, entitled Reading Law, co-authored 
with Brian A. Garner: 
It is one thing to regard government liability as exceptional enough to require 
clarity of creation as a matter of presumed legislative intent.  It is quite something 
else to presume that a legislature that has clearly made the determination that 
government liability is in the interests of justice wants to accompany that 
determination with nit-picking technicalities that would not accompany other 
causes of action.
17
 
However, a conceptual error deeper even than the conflation of the 
merits with jurisdiction, or the misuse of the rule of strict construction, 
mars the analysis in Jackson: the court’s premise that the United States 
may waive its immunity to suit on any terms that it wishes, even if those 
terms violate the Constitution.  In dismissing Jackson for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction because the filing was untimely under the so-called 
“mailbox rule,” the court of appeals failed to consider an important 
constitutional question: whether the equality and due-process provisions 
of the Fifth Amendment bar the government from conditioning its 
consent to suit upon a procedure that irrationally sorts claimants into 
those to whom the agency provides timely and adequate notice before 
they proceed to federal court, and those from whom the government 
withholds such notice.
18
  Admittedly, only one Supreme Court decision 
has come even close to acknowledging that there are limits to the 
government’s authority to waive its sovereign immunity—the 
notoriously puzzling opinion in United States v. Klein.
19
  However, since 
Klein, the Court has held in Boumediene v. Bush that Congress’s 
withdrawal of jurisdiction over habeas corpus relief must comport with 
 
16 Gregory C. Sisk, The Inevitability of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 55 VILL. L. REV. 
899, 923 (2010) (“Not unerringly or with consistent clarity, the Supreme Court appears to be 
drifting toward an approach that reserves strict construction and presumptions in favor of the 
government to core questions about whether sovereign immunity has been expressly waived 
and the basic scope of that waiver.”); see also Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on the Doctrine of 
Federal Sovereign Immunity, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 439, 462 (2005) (noting “small cracks in the 
edifice of strict construction”); Gregory C. Sisk, Twilight for the Strict Construction of 
Waivers of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 92 N.C.  L. REV. 1245, 1320 (2014) (“The period of 
strict construction of statutory waivers of federal sovereign immunity is closing.”).  
17 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 285 (2012).  
18 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
19 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871); Gordon G. Young, supra note 
3, at 1197 (“Klein holds that there are limits upon Congress’ power to invoke the sovereign 
immunity.  Indeed, Klein is the only case in our constitutional history so to hold.”); see also 
Lawrence G. Sager, Klein’s First Principle: A Proposed Solution, 86 GEO. L.J. 2525, 2525 
(1998) (referring to “the puzzle of Klein”).   
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the Constitution’s Suspension Clause.
20
  Moreover, in numerous 
decisions, the Court has recognized that questions about the scope of 
Congress’s power to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts are of 
sufficient seriousness as to warrant efforts to interpret the challenged 
statute to avoid constitutional problems.
21
  While accepting the 
contentious principle that “[t]he King cannot be sued without his 
consent,” this article argues that when an immunity-waiver operates as 
the functional equivalent of a statute that regulates federal jurisdiction, 
the waiver ought to be subject to the structural and substantive limits that 
constrain a jurisdiction-regulating statute—limits that are narrow, but not 
nonexistent.
22
  These constraints hold particular importance when, as in 
Jackson, the immunity-waiver not only extinguishes individual property 
interests, but also impairs the decisional independence of the federal 
courts. 
Part II of this article locates Jackson and its messy procedural story 
within the FTCA’s statutory and regulatory framework.  Part III is the 
core of the article and explains why the approach of the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Jackson is wrong—indeed, “dead wrong”—for it 
assumes that Congress can use its waiver authority to regulate federal 
jurisdiction in ways that circumvent constitutional limits.
23
  Certainly 
Congress has broad power to regulate the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts.
24
  But that power is not unfettered; although the limits are not well-
defined, congressional power over federal jurisdiction is subject to 
 
20 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (Suspension 
Clause). 
21 See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988) (applying the doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance to a jurisdiction-regulating statute involving suit against the United States). 
22 Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 1 (1963); see Kathryn E. Kovacs, Revealing Redundancy: The Tension Between 
Federal Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 77, 100 (2005) (“Of 
course, Congress’s control over jurisdiction has its limitations.”); see also John M. Maguire, 
State Liability for Tort, 30 HARV. L. REV. 20, 20 (1916) (“[T]he king can do no wrong . . . is 
pointless where there is no king.”). 
23 See, e.g., Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2317 n.3 (2013) (“[t]he 
majority is dead wrong”) (Kagan, , J., dissenting); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 
S. Ct. 2780, 2803 (2011) (“To hold that Asahi controls this case would, to put it bluntly, be 
dead wrong.”) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 
310, 409 (2010) (“I am perfectly willing to concede that if one of our precedents were dead 
wrong in its reasoning or irreconcilable with the rest of our doctrine, there would be a 
compelling basis for revisiting it.”) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
24 For an early and canonical case, see Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) 
(holding that statute withholding diversity jurisdiction from federal courts when diversity of 
citizenship was created by assignment was not “in conflict with the Constitution”). 
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constraints that are both internal and external to Article III of the 
Constitution.
25
  These constraints protect not only separation of powers, 
but also individual liberty.
26
  As Justice O’Connor explained in 
Commodities Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, “Article III, § 1, 
serves both to protect ‘the role of the independent judiciary within the 
constitutional scheme of tripartite government,’ and to safeguard 
litigants’ ‘right to have claims decided before judges who are free from 
potential domination by other branches of government.’”
27
  This Part 
explains why the government’s conduct in Jackson ran afoul of the 
plaintiff’s right to equal protection and due process.  In addition, the 
immunity-waiver undermined judicial independence by conscripting the 
Article III courts “to speak a constitutional untruth”—the essence of the 
so-called Klein principle—by vesting jurisdiction in the court only to 
dismiss the complaint and so to validate the extinguishing of the 
plaintiff’s claims despite constitutional violations.
28
  Rather than 
dismissing the plaintiff’s claim in Jackson for a procedural or 
jurisdictional defect, the court of appeals ought to have barred Congress 
from conditioning jurisdiction upon a procedure that violates the Fifth 
Amendment guarantee of equal treatment and due process.
29
 
Finally, Part IV proposes a way to deal with the specific problem 
that motivated the discussion, namely, the FTCA’s apparent use of a 
mailbox-rule to start the clock running for the filing of a lawsuit in federal 
court even when the claimant has received no notice and files suit late 
due to no fault of her own.  When faced with a reading of a statute that 
 
25 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 
1043, 1050 (2010) (referring to “understandings of Congress’s power to control jurisdiction 
with non-originalist developments in substantive constitutional law”); see also Lawrence 
Gene Sager, Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Power to Regulate the Jurisdiction of 
the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 22–26 (1981) (examining the source of 
constitutional limits upon congressional power to regulate the jurisdiction of the lower federal 
courts and of the Supreme Court to adjudicate constitutional claims).   
26 See Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene’s Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the 
Separation of Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2138 (2009) (discussing “uncontested 
assertion that both individual rights and the separation of powers are impacted when Congress 
constrains Article III review”). 
27 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (quoting 
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985) and United States v. 
Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980)).  
28 Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2357, 
2538, 2540 (1998) (defining the Klein principle).  
29 Jackson v. United States, No. 12-10124, 2013 WL 361010 at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 
2013). 
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would raise serious constitutional questions, the Court typically resorts to 
a canon of avoidance and seeks an interpretation that aligns the statutory 
text with congressional purpose and constitutional requirements.
30
  
Consistent with this approach, the article suggests a reading of the FTCA 
that is faithful to the statute’s text and consistent with equality and due-
process guarantees.  Surely in enacting the FTCA Congress did not 
condition the government’s waiver of immunity upon “nit-picking” 
technicalities of the sort that Justice Scalia has criticized.
31
  At the very 
least, the argument presented ought to persuade the United States to 
rethink its litigation position with respect to the FTCA limitations-period 
to ensure that an agency does not insulate its employees’ alleged 
wrongdoing by withholding timely and adequate notice, and in doing so, 
preventing the injured party from securing judicial redress. 
 
II. JACKSON V. UNITED STATES, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, AND 
 FEDERAL JURISDICTION 
Jackson illustrates the thousands of tort claims annually filed against 
the United States; together these FTCA suits expose the government to 
liability that could amount to billions of dollars if the alleged injuries are 
proved.
32
  The immunity of the United States is said to bar the federal 
court’s disposition of these tort claims absent Congress’s clear statement 
that the government has consented to suit.
33
  The FTCA waives the 
government’s immunity and confers jurisdiction upon the federal courts 
to hear such claims on the same terms as would apply to a private 
individual under the governing state law.  Decisions both reported and 
unreported point to a broad range of plaintiffs: examples include a widow 
 
30 See Schor, 478 U.S. at 841; Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345–48 
(1936) (describing techniques to avoid unnecessary constitutional decisions by the Supreme 
Court). 
31 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 17, at 285. 
32 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DIVISION, FY 2015 BUDGET AND PERFORMANCE 
PLANS, SUBMITTED TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES  (Mar. 2014) (stating that the 
Civil Division annually “defeats billions of dollars in unmerited damages,” but that estimate 
includes tort claims as well as contract and other financial claims). 
33 See Ugo Colella & Adam Bain, The Burden of Proving Jurisdiction Under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act: A Uniform Approach to Allocation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2859, 2866 (1999) 
(“Consistent with ‘waiver-of-sovereign-immunity’ principles and general principles 
governing federal subject matter jurisdiction,” the argument presented “begins with the 
presumption that a federal court does not have jurisdiction over a tort suit brought against the 
United States.”).  For a discussion of the historical bases of the traditional view that immunity 
bars such suit, see Jackson, supra note 1, at 522 (explaining that “sovereign immunity was a 
doctrine of limited effect in the early years of this republic”).   
HELEN HERSHKOFF.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/3/2015  3:47 PM 
2015] WAIVERS OF IMMUNITY 251 
whose spouse was mauled to death by a grizzly bear in a national forest, 
the widow of a veteran who died because of alleged medical malpractice 
in a hospital operated by the Veterans’ Administration, and a prisoner 
who alleged rape by a prison guard.
34
  Like Jackson, most of these 
lawsuits—around eighty percent—are dismissed for jurisdictional 
reasons or on the merits.
35
 
A lawsuit filed under the FTCA may face a dismissal on 
jurisdictional grounds for one of two reasons.  First, the FTCA excludes 
specific kinds of government actions from the grant of jurisdiction.
36
  In 
addition, the Court has created another exception—the so-called Feres 
doctrine—which excludes claims by members of the Armed Forces for 
injuries suffered that are “incident to service.”
37
  As a matter of 
jurisdiction, a court might dismiss a suit because it alleges a claim that 
falls outside the government’s consent to suit; on this basis, courts 
typically will dismiss a claim alleging rape of a prisoner as outside the 
immunity-waiver because the suit involves an intentional tort and the 
statute extends only to claims of negligence.
38
  The jurisdictional 
 
34 See, e.g., Evert v. United States, 535 F. App’x. 703 (10th Cir. 2013); Warrum v. United 
States, 427 F. 3d 1048 (7th Cir. 2005); Santillo v. United States, 2011 WL 2729243 (S.D. Cal. 
2011).  
35 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DIVISION, supra note 32, at 22 (stating that the Justice 
Department defeats at least 85 percent of defensive claims, which include federal-tort and 
other suits); id. at 17 (setting forth the percentage of defensive cases resolved in government’s 
favor). 
36 See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (a)–(n) (2012) (providing that the jurisdictional grant under 28 
U.S.C. § 1346(b) “shall not apply” to the claims listed in § 2680, which include “a 
discretionary function  . . . whether or not the discretion involved be abused”; “the loss, 
miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matters”; “the assessment or 
collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods” (subject to exceptions);  
“certain suits in admiralty”; certain acts related to portions of Title 50 of the United States 
Code related to war and defense; acts resulting from quarantine; acts resulting from “assault, 
battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, libel, slander, 
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights” (however jurisdiction is 
extended for “acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United 
States Government” that result in claims arising “out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, 
false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution”; “the fiscal operations of the Treasury 
or by the regulation of the monetary system”; combatant activities “during time of war”; and 
from activities in a foreign country, of the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Panama Canal 
Company, or a “Federal land bank, a Federal intermediate credit bank, or a bank for 
cooperatives”). 
37 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). 
38 See, e.g., Lineberry v. United States, No. 08-0597, 2009 WL 763052, *7–8 (N.D. Tex. 
Mar. 23, 2009) (dismissing prisoner’s claim that guards retaliated against him by arranging 
for another prisoner to assault him as outside the government’s waiver as an intentional tort). 
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exclusions thus preserve government immunity for misconduct that 
otherwise would be actionable in a dispute involving two individuals—
for example, an assault and battery or sexual abuse.
39
 
A second possible defect reflects the imprecision that has attached 
to the term jurisdiction as distinct from questions going to the merits or 
involving mere procedure.
40
  As in Jackson, many courts will dismiss a 
case when the plaintiff fails to meet an administrative rule governing the 
agency’s investigation and denial of a claim.
41
  For example, the FTCA 
requires that a claim first be presented to the agency and that the written 
statement set forth a “sum-certain” for damages.
42
  Many courts treat this 
requirement as jurisdictional.
43
  Under this approach, a plaintiff who has 
presented an agency with a claim for damages of “about” or “in excess” 
of a stated dollar amount, rather than for a specific dollar amount, will be 
treated as having failed to meet the procedural requirement of claim-
presentment and the later-filed court action will be dismissed for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction—even though the agency already will have 
investigated the claim, in no way lacked notice of the claim, and never 
informed the claimant of this purported defect.
44
  It seems unlikely that 
the procedures governing agency exhaustion are jurisdictional in the 
relevant sense under the Court’s clarifying approach.
45
  The procedures 
 
39 See, e.g., Doughty v. U.S. Postal Serv., 359 F. Supp. 2d 361, 367 (D.N.J. 2005) 
(dismissing Postal Service employee’s claim of sexual assault by a co-worker because statute 
excludes claims for assault and battery). 
40 See Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Substantiality, 42 TULSA L. REV. 
579, 579 (2007) (criticizing the frequency with which federal courts conflate jurisdiction 
“with the substantive merits of federal claims of right”). 
41 Jackson v. United States, No. 12–10124, 2013 WL 361010 at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 
2013). 
42 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b) (2012) (“Action under this section shall not be instituted for any 
sum in excess of the amount of the claim presented to the federal agency, except where the 
increased amount is based upon newly discovered evidence not reasonably discoverable at 
the time of presenting the claim to the federal agency, or upon allegation and proof of 
intervening facts, relating to the amount of the claim.”); Kokotis v. U.S. Postal Serv., 223 
F.3d 275, 277 (4th Cir. 2000) (failure to timely demand “sum certain” deprived a court of 
jurisdiction); see also 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) (2015). 
43 See, e.g., Rispoli v. United States, 576 F. Supp. 1398 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 779 F.2d 
35 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1069 (1986). 
44 See, e.g., Gladden v. United States, 18 F. App’x 756 (10th Cir. 2001) (dismissing suit 
alleging that Bureau of Prisons employee committed suicide due to alleged improper training 
because damages sought were stated to be “in excess of $100,000.00” and so did not meet the 
sum-certain requirement). 
45 See, e.g., Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197 (2011) (holding 
that 120-day deadline for filing appeals to veterans court was not jurisdictional); Arbaugh v. 
Y. & H. Corp. 546 U.S. 500 (2006) (holding that numerosity requirement under civil rights 
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appear in sections of the statute separate from those that confer or exclude 
jurisdiction, and the statute does not classify them as jurisdictional; 
instead, the statute treats them as classic rules for processing a claim, 
dealing with such matters as the content of a pleading.
46
  Nevertheless, a 
suit marred by a single and even trivial deviation from the rules governing 
administrative review is at risk of being dismissed by the court as lacking 
subject-matter jurisdiction, and the claimant is “forever” barred from 
seeking legal recourse.
47
 
Lawsuits falling into this second category—dismissed on what 
might be considered to be faux jurisdictional grounds—often turn, as in 
Jackson, on small and seemingly insignificant facts.
48
  Jackson arose from 
a garden-variety car accident on January 13, 2009.
49
  According to the 
Standard 95 Form submitted, the police reported that the plaintiff’s car 
was properly stopped at the intersection of Abbott and Third Street in 
Detroit, Michigan, when a car in the opposing lane crossed the centerline 
at full speed and hit the plaintiff’s car head-on.
50
  The plaintiff suffered 
“multiple injuries, including damage to her head and spinal cord.”
51
  What 
made the case a federal one—and subject to administrative exhaustion—
was the status of the other driver: an Assistant Special Agent who worked 
at the Detroit Field Office of the United States Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”).
52
  After the accident, the plaintiff hired a lawyer 
named Michael Shaffer who was associated with a Detroit firm known 
colloquially as “Michigan Autolaw.”
53
  The FTCA requires that a 
 
statute was not jurisdictional).  But see Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007) (holding that 
time period for filing notice of appeal was jurisdictional). 
46 See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515 (2006) (providing that when Congress does not clearly 
state that a threshold limitation is jurisdictional, “courts should treat the restriction as 
nonjurisdictional in character”).  Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2012) (conferring 
jurisdiction) and 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2012) (exclusions from jurisdiction), with 28 U.S.C. § 
2401(b) (2012) (time periods for suit) and 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (exhaustion required). 
47 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). 
48 See Jackson v. United States, No. 12-10124, 2013 WL 361010 at *1–2 (E.D. Mich. Jan 
30, 2013). 
49 Id. at *1. 
50 Id.; see also Exhibit 1, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 36–37, Jackson v. United 
States, No. 12-10124, 2013 WL 361010 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2013) (providing the court with 
the Standard Form 95).  
51 Jackson v. United States 751 F.3d 712, 714 (6th Cir. 2014).  
52 Id.  
53 Id.; see MICHIGAN AUTOLAW, http://www.michiganautolaw.com/ (last visited Feb. 18, 
2015) (describing the law firm as “auto accident attorneys,” calling one partner an “auto law 
guru,” and not listing federal tort suits as within its expertise). 
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claimant submit her claim to the agency involved in the incident within 
two years of the accrual of the claim, even if the state statute of limitations 
is longer.
54
  On March 5, 2009, within the two-year period and consistent 
with agency regulations, lawyer-Shaffer mailed ICE a written claim, 
listing the amount of damages sought, together with a letter documenting 
his authority to represent the plaintiff.
55
  ICE received the claim “on or 
about June 17, 2009,” and a paralegal working at ICE named Toyya 
Azian mailed a letter addressed to “Claimant,” dated July 7, 2009, to 
lawyer-Shaffer acknowledging the claim’s receipt.
56
   The FTCA requires 
agencies to investigate and then either to settle or to deny a claim within 
six months of receipt.
57
  Regulations further require the agency to send a 
written denial of a claim to the claimant, her lawyer, or her 
representative.
58
  The claimant has the option of filing a lawsuit if the 
agency does not take action within the six-month period.
59
  On January 
11, 2012, with the state limitations-period about to close and the claim 
neither denied nor settled by the agency, the plaintiff—through a second 
lawyer named Phillip Serafini, not associated with Michigan Autolaw—
 
54 See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2012).  
55 See Exhibit 1, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 35–37, Jackson, No. 12-10124, 2013 
WL 361010 (providing the court with a letter from Michael R. Shaffer to the U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security, dated March 5, 2009, and the Standard Form 95). 
56 Jackson, 2013 WL 361010, at *1; Exhibit 2, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 38, 
Jackson, No. 12-10124, 2013 WL 361010 (providing the court with a letter from Toyya Azian 
of ICE to Claimant, dated July 7, 2009).  ICE is the investigative arm of the Department of 
Homeland Security.  It is not immediately apparent from ICE’s website that for federal-tort 
purposes, ICE is treated as a separate agency from Homeland Security.  See U.S. 
IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/about (last visited Feb. 18, 
2015).  Shaffer mailed the claim to the latter’s address.  Jackson, 2013 WL 361010, at *1.  
Technically the plaintiff’s claim was filed with the wrong agency—an error that is not unusual 
among FTCA claimants and others who sue federal agencies.  See John S. Gannon, Note, 
Federal Tort Claims Act —Seeking Redress Against the Sovereign: Balancing the Rights of 
Plaintiffs and the Government When Applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) to FTCA 
Claims, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 223, 229–30 (2007) (discussing dismissal of FTCA suits for 
naming the wrong government agency and amendments to the federal rules attempting to 
obviate aspects of this problem).  Federal regulations require transfer of the claim to the 
agency involved in the incident, which Homeland Security did two months after it had 
received the claim.  See 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(b)(1) (2015). 
57 See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (2012). 
58 See 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) (2015).  
59 See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b); 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); see also Ugo Colella, The Case for 
Borrowing a Limitations Period for Deemed-Denial Suits Brought Pursuant to the Federal 
Tort Claims Act, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 391, 399–402 (1998) (discussing the legislative 
history to the deemed-denial provision of the FTCA).   
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filed two lawsuits: a federal suit under the FTCA against the United States 
and a state suit under state law against the ICE agent involved in the 
accident.
60
  As provided by statute, the United States Attorney General 
removed the state action to federal court and substituted the United States 
for the federal employee; eventually, the court consolidated the removed 
action with the FTCA suit.
61
  With both suits now in federal court, the 
government moved to dismiss the pair for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction on the ground that they were untimely because filed more 
than six months after ICE had mailed its notice of denial of the claim.
62
  
Only through that motion did the plaintiff learn that ICE had denied her 
claim; that it had sent a certified letter to that effect dated March 3, 2011, 
postmarked later, to lawyer-Shaffer; that the letter had been returned to 
ICE on March 23, 2011, stamped by the United States Postal Service as 
“Not Deliverable as Addressed, Unable to Forward”; and that ICE had 
taken no further steps to contact the plaintiff even though the case file 
contained her address as well as her lawyer’s telephone number and email 
address.
63
 
What happened before ICE mailed the notice is disputed; the district 
court did not hold a hearing or order discovery and instead relied on the 
parties’ affidavits which set forth conflicting accounts.
64
  On the 
plaintiff’s side, the lawyer named Shaffer averred that he had called ICE’s 
representative—the paralegal named Azian—about fifteen times trying 
to settle the claim, but the representative had returned only one of his calls 
and the matter had not resolved.
65
  He acknowledged that Michigan 
Autolaw had moved in May 2010, but stated that its phone number and 
email address, already in the ICE file, had remained the same; that at the 
time of the office’s move, the firm had put in a forwarding order with the 
United States Postal Service; and that when the order expired, the firm 
used a “runner” to pick-up mail at the post office.
66
  The second lawyer, 
named Serafini, also submitted an affidavit, averring that ICE’s 
 
60 See Jackson v. United States, 751 F.3d 712, 715 (6th Cir. 2014). 
61 See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2) (2012); Jackson, 751 F.3d at 715; PAUL FIGLEY, A GUIDE 
TO THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 55 (2012) (discussing procedure governing substitution of 
the United States for the individual employee).   
62 Jackson, 751 F.3d at 715. 
63 Id. at 714–15 
64 Id. at 715–16.  
65 Id. at 715. 
66 Id.  
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representative had called him on February 2, 2011, to request that he file 
a new demand letter and that he had notes of that phone call, which had 
been logged in the usual course into the firm’s entry-system; that 
statement seems to be supported by an exhibit to the government’s 
motion showing that someone at ICE, presumably the representative with 
whom the lawyer talked, had hand written Serafini’s name and phone 
number at the bottom of the page of ICE’s copy of Shaffer’s earlier letter 
accompanying the claim.
67
  On the defendant’s side, ICE averred that it 
had received no written notice of the plaintiff’s change of counsel and 
had no record of any phone call between its representative named Azian 
and Serafini.  Moreover, ICE stated that it no longer employed the 
representative named Azian.
68
 
The district court dismissed the suit as time-barred and lacking in 
subject-matter jurisdiction, and it refused to subject the limitations period 
to equitable tolling.
69
  On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reviewed the jurisdictional dismissal de novo and affirmed.  The court 
explained that a suit against the United States will be dismissed unless it 
falls within the government’s waiver of immunity; here, the plaintiff 
failed to meet the limitations period upon which the government’s 
consent to suit was conditioned—that is, “a claimant may sue the United 
States pursuant to the FTCA six months after presenting a claim to an 
agency. . . . A claimant may no longer sue the United States six months 
after the time that an agency mails a denial letter.”
70
  The appeals court 
rejected the argument that an “‘undelivered notice of denial’ does not 
trigger the six-month limitation window,” pointing to the text of the 
statute which uses the word “mailing” of a denial, not receipt of a denial.
71
  
It further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in not 
equitably tolling the claim, and it did not consider whether application of 
the mailbox-rule to extinguish the plaintiff’s claim violated the 
Constitution and so ought to have affected the jurisdictional analysis.
72
  
The court denied a request for en banc review.
73
 
 
67 Id.; Exhibit 1 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 35, Jackson v. United States, No. 12-
10124, 2013 WL 361010 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2013). 
68 Jackson, 751 F.3d at 715. 
69 Id. at 716. 
70 Id. at 717 (internal citations omitted). 
71 Id.  
72 Id. at 719. 
73 Id. at 712. 
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III. WAIVERS OF IMMUNITY AND CONGRESS’S POWER TO REGULATE 
 FEDERAL JURISDICTION 
The court of appeals in Jackson concentrated only on whether the 
plaintiff met the procedures for administrative exhaustion, procedures 
that the court characterized as jurisdictional because seen as conditions 
of the government’s waiver of immunity to suit.  The court of appeals did 
not consider whether those conditions comported with constitutional 
requirements.  This Part argues that Congress ought not to be able to 
waive its immunity to suit on terms that circumvent the Fifth Amendment 
of the federal Constitution, as it did in Jackson when it withheld notice 
from the plaintiff and then effectively blocked her from securing relief on 
the merits.  Congress may have unfettered control in deciding whether to 
waive its immunity or not.  However, once it submits to suit, the United 
States cannot disregard the requirements of equal protection or due 
process. 
 
A. Sovereign Immunity and the Waiver Power 
Although no principle is more entrenched in American law than that 
of sovereign immunity, no principle is more contested and less grounded 
in history or text.
74
  Because of sovereign immunity, the federal courts 
traditionally assumed that they were without power to grant relief against 
the United States for torts committed by its agents.
75
  After many years of 
consideration—and weighed down by the private-bill system that doled 
out compensation in place of administrative and judicial relief—
Congress enacted the FTCA, waiving its immunity to suit and conferring 
jurisdiction on the federal courts to hear claims that are cognizable under 
 
74 See Diane P. Wood, The Structure of Sovereignty, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 215, 219 
(2014) (stating that the doctrine of sovereign immunity appears to be a structural 
constitutional doctrine that is inferred from the overall Constitution itself, just like separation 
of powers, rights of privacy, or incorporation of critical provisions of the Bill of Rights into 
the Fourteenth Amendment).  Compare Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) 
(“A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, 
but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority 
that makes the law on which the right depends.”) (Holmes, J.), with Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Shifting the Balance of Power? The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Sovereign 
Immunity: Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1202 (2001) (stating that 
“[t]he effect of sovereign immunity is to place the government above the law . . . ”).   
75 See Alexander Holtzoff, The Handling of Tort Claims Against the Federal 
Government, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311 (1942).  But see Jackson, supra note 1, at 523–
52 (presenting a critical account of the assumption about traditional practice). 
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the statute.
76
  In an early case interpreting the FTCA, the Supreme Court 
rejected the government’s argument that its waiver of immunity “must be 
strictly construed.”
77
  To the contrary, the Court emphasized that, 
the congressional attitude in passing the Tort Claims Act is more accurately 
reflected by Judge Cardozo’s statement . . . ‘The exemption of the sovereign from 
suit involves hardship enough, where consent has been withheld. We are not to 
add to its rigor  . . . where consent has been announced.’
78
 
Nevertheless, for the last generation, courts have honored Justice 
Cardozo’s statement in the breach.  Decisions construing the FTCA 
generally have invoked what is known as the “sovereign immunity 
canon”—that a waiver will be “strictly construed in favor of the 
sovereign” without attending to other indications of Congressional intent 
or statutory text.
79
  Moreover, the canon has been extended to procedures 
attached to the waiver, and not simply to whether immunity has been 
waived.
80
  As in Jackson, the application of this canon almost inevitably 
results in the dismissal of a suit that fails to meet the procedural 
requirements of administrative exhaustion, however technical or trivial 
the plaintiff’s deviation or omission.
81
  The Supreme Court appears to 
have moved away from this approach.
82
  However, lower courts have not 
consistently responded to the doctrinal shift.
83
 
 
 
76 See generally Floyd D. Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States: 
The Evolution from a Legislative Toward a Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV. 625 
(1985) (explaining the history of the move from private bills to legal claims).  
77 United States v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 383 (1949). 
78 Id. (quoting Anderson v. Hayes Constr. Co., 153 N.E. 28, 29–30 (1926)). 
79 Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187 (1996).  See generally Alex Kardon, Damages Under the 
Privacy Act: Sovereign Immunity and a Call for Legislative Reform, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 705 (2011). 
80 See Aaron Tang, Double Immunity, 65 STAN. L. REV. 279 (2013) (using the term 
“double immunity” to refer to the requirement that a sovereign must expressly waive 
immunity from suit and for monetary relief). 
81 E.g., Tasha Hill, Inmates’ Need for Federally Funded Lawyers: How the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act, Casey, and Iqbal Combine with Implicit Bias to Eviscerate Inmate 
Civil Rights, 62 UCLA L. REV. 176, 199–201 (2015) (“[m]inor technical errors filling out any 
forms also bar meritorious claims”).  
82 See, e.g., Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 234–224 (2007) (criticizing the doctrine of “total 
exhaustion” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act).  
83 Dolan v. United States Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 492 (2006) (internal quotation 
omitted).  See generally Sisk, Twilight for the Strict Construction of Waivers of Federal 
Sovereign Immunity, supra note 16, at 1245 (arguing that the Court no longer strictly 
construes waivers of sovereign immunity). 
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B. Congressional Regulation of Jurisdiction 
The court of appeals in Jackson closely examined whether the 
plaintiff filed her lawsuit on time, but it failed to consider whether the 
procedures used by the government to trigger the filing period 
impermissibly circumvented constitutional requirements.  Rather, the 
court operated on the premise that Congress is free to condition its 
consent to suit in federal court on any terms that it wishes, even when the 
waiver is treated as the functional equivalent of a grant of jurisdiction.  
This article challenges that assumption, and the ease with which the court 
eliminated the possibility of judicial review.  Traditionally, scholars have 
assigned immunity-waivers and jurisdictional grants to separate and 
different doctrinal categories, while commentary acknowledges that it is 
not easy to draw the boundary between a waiver of immunity and a grant 
of jurisdiction.
84
  What Henry M. Hart called “the bearing of sovereign 
immunity” figured awkwardly into his canonical Dialogue on “the power 
of Congress to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts.”
85
  Professor Hart 
put to the side the question of “what constitutes such a suit” once the 
government has given its consent.
86
  Section 1346(b) has been construed 
to be both a waiver of immunity and a grant of jurisdiction.
87
  Not all 
statutes involving suits against the United States share this hybrid quality.  
A waiver of immunity does not always involve a conferral of jurisdiction 
over claims to which the government has given its consent.
88
  Likewise, a 
 
84 See Jackson, supra note 1, at 571 (“Sorting out the independent effect of ‘sovereign 
immunity’ apart from the question of congressional control of the federal courts’ jurisdiction 
is difficult.”). 
85 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: 
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1370 (1953); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, 
Why Klein (Still) Matters: Congressional Deception and the War on Terrorism, 5 J. NAT’L 
SECURITY L. & POL’Y 251, 253 (2011) (referring to the Dialogue and the difficulty of 
subjecting congressional control of federal jurisdiction to any limit in the face of sovereign 
immunity). 
86 Hart, supra note 85.   
87 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2012) provides in pertinent part: that the federal district courts 
“shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for 
money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or 
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee 
of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under 
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in 
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 
88 See, e.g., Jaimes v. Lucas Metro. Hous. Auth., 833 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1987) (waiver 
of immunity under the National Housing Act does not confer jurisdiction on the federal 
courts).  
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conferral of jurisdiction does not always lift the government’s immunity 
from suit despite the court’s power to hear claims should the United 
States give its consent.
89
  Sometimes, however, a waiver and a grant of 
jurisdiction do go hand-in-hand; as the Supreme Court explained with 
respect to the Tucker Act, involving subsection (a) of Section 1346: 
It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that 
the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.  The terminology 
employed in some of our prior decisions has unfortunately generated some 
confusion as to whether the Tucker Act constitutes a waiver of sovereign 
immunity.  The time has come to resolve this confusion. . . . [B]y giving the Court 
of Claims jurisdiction over specified types of claims against the United States, 
the Tucker Act constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to those 
claims.
90
 
 Suggesting that the FTCA’s waiver ought to be treated as the 
functional equivalent of a grant of jurisdiction, and so subject to the same 
scrutiny as a grant of jurisdiction, is not to say that a waiver and grant of 
jurisdiction are equivalent in every way.  Conceptually, there exists the 
unanswered question whether sovereign immunity is properly treated as 
jurisdictional.
91
  No provision of the Constitution explicitly withholds 
jurisdiction from suits involving the United States, unlike the specific 
exclusion of suits involving the states under the Eleventh Amendment.
92
  
 
89 Thus, for example, it is settled doctrine that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 does not confer 
jurisdiction upon the federal courts to hear suits against the United States absent the 
government’s waiver of its immunity.  See Whittle v. United States, 7 F.3d 1259, 1262 (6th 
Cir. 1993) (“The federal question jurisdictional statute is not a general waiver of sovereign 
immunity; it merely establishes a subject matter that is within the competence of federal courts 
to entertain.”); Army & Air Force Exch. Serv. v. Sheehan, 456 U.S. 728 (1982) (28 U.S.C. § 
1331 confers jurisdiction upon the district courts but does not the immunity of the United 
States).  
90 United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983); see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (2012) 
(conferring original jurisdiction and waiving immunity).  
91 See Scott C. Idleman, The Emergence of Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal 
Courts, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 87–89 (2001) (discussing the extent to which sovereign 
immunity poses a genuine restriction on the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction); see also 
Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 
1559 (2002) (arguing that sovereign immunity is a doctrine of personal jurisdiction, not 
subject-matter jurisdiction, and thus can be waived, forfeited, or subject to consent).   
92 See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”); 
see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (“Although the text of the 
Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal 
courts, ‘we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, 
but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms.’”) (citing Blatchford v. Native Vill. of 
Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)); Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 
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Moreover, although immunity blocks the court from exercising 
jurisdiction unless the government consents to suit, jurisdictional rules 
conventionally do not recognize consent or waiver as a basis of 
competence.
93
  Descriptively, the immunity-waiver in Jackson enlarges 
jurisdiction by conferring jurisdiction over claims to which Congress has 
manifested the government’s consent.  The jurisdiction-regulating 
statutes that usually draw academic attention withhold power from the 
federal court over discrete claims or remedies.
94
  The FTCA also sets forth 
procedures, some of which limit the court’s jurisdiction and some of 
which pertain to the claim.  Statutes regulating jurisdiction also may 
inpose conditions on the court’s power.
95
  Courts have sometimes 
conflated these jurisdictional conditions with claims-processing rules that 
ought not to be treated as jurisdictional.  At the least, the interrelationship 
between the FTCA’s waiver and its grant of jurisdiction raises questions 
about the scope of Congress’s power—questions that the court of appeals 
in Jackson entirely ignored. 
 
C. Constitutional Limits on Congressional Authority to Waive 
Immunity 
Unlike most statutes that purport to regulate the jurisdiction of the 
Article III courts, the immunity-waiver in Jackson does not on the surface 
deprive the federal court of jurisdiction; to the contrary, it confers 
jurisdiction, allowing the court to exercise power over law suits that are 
timely filed by litigants after they have received notice that the agency 
 
STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1202 (2001) (“Nowhere does the . . . [Constitution] mention or even 
imply that governments have complete immunity to suit.”).   
93 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 710 (1999) (“sovereign immunity bars suits [against 
a state] only in the absence of consent”); The Siren, 74 U.S. 152, 154 (1868) (“[The United 
States] cannot be subjected to legal proceedings at law or in equity without their consent, and 
whoever institutes such proceedings must bring his case within the authority of some act of 
Congress.”); Dustin E. Buehler, Solving Jurisdiction’s Social Cost, 89 WASH. L. REV. 653, 
654 (2014) (“[T[he parties cannot consent to or waive jurisdictional requirements.”).    
94 See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: 
An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984).  The Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2005, codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, and 1711–15, provides 
a counter-example to this generalization.  See Adam N. Steinman, Sausage-Making, Pigs’ 
Ears, and Congressional Expansions of Federal Jurisdiction: Exxon Mobil v. Allapattah and 
Its Lessons for the Class Action Fairness Act, 81 WASH. L. REV. 279 (2006). 
95 See Lawson, supra note 2, at 191 (distinguishing between wholesale jurisdiction-
stripping and the regulation of how federal courts exercise their jurisdiction); see also Fallon, 
Jr., supra note 25 (discussing jurisdiction-stripping provisions and the withdrawal of effective 
remedies). 
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has denied their claims.  As interpreted by the court in Jackson, the 
immunity-waiver also withholds power over lawsuits that are not timely 
filed even if the agency did not actually notify the plaintiff that the claim 
had been denied and the plaintiff had no other way to learn that the 
limitations-period for filing suit was running.  The question posed in this 
Part is whether the Constitution forbids Congress from affecting a waiver 
on these terms. 
Certainly Article III would bar Congress from conferring 
jurisdiction that goes beyond the enumerated categories of cases and 
controversies set forth in Section 2.
96
  This is the basic teaching of 
Marbury v. Madison: Congress cannot add to the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts.
97
  Moreover, the Marbury-limit also seems to apply to the 
notion of judicial power set forth in Section 1—for example, Congress’s 
power to confer standing is constrained by some notion of justiciability 
that is distinct from Section 2.
98
  Looking at the FTCA, surely Congress 
could not waive its immunity on the condition that tort suits filed against 
it be heard only as an original matter in the Supreme Court of the United 
States, for the Constitution by its terms provides for no such jurisdiction.
99
  
Similarly, under current doctrine, Congress presumably could not waive 
its immunity through the FTCA and confer jurisdiction on citizen-suits 
by individuals who suspect agency misconduct but lack injury 
proximately caused by a federal employee’s alleged negligence—the 
waiver would not meet the injury-in-fact requirement that the Court 
associates with Article III standing and the unaffected bystander would 
face a dismissal of the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
100
 
 
96 U.S. CONST.  art. III, § 2 (setting forth enumerated categories of cases or controversies 
that are within the judicial power). 
97 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176–80 (1803). 
98 See generally Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 
B.U. L. REV. 159 (2011). 
99 The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is limited to “Cases affecting 
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party.”  
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176–80; Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 
13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443, 452 (1989) 
(“Yet Marbury emphatically forecloses such an argument, for the Court holds not only that 
original jurisdiction need not be expanded when appellate jurisdiction is contracted, but 
indeed that original jurisdiction may never be expanded.”).  But see Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is 
Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1207, 1208 (2001) (“[A] competing tradition 
. . . dispenses federal judicial power based on how important the Court considers the federal 
interest at stake, on the merits[.]”). 
100 See Lexmark Intern., Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1390 
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The waiver in Jackson presents a different kind of problem: it 
specifies the manner in which jurisdiction is to be determined, allowing 
power to be exercised over timely filed claims, and uses the agency’s 
mailing of a denial letter as the starting point for the limitations-period 
even when the agency and the court know that the claimant received no 
notice.  This Part argues that even if the government cannot be compelled 
to waive its immunity to suit, it may not condition jurisdiction on 
processes that are so arbitrary and irrational as to circumvent the equality 
and due-process requirements of the Fifth Amendment.
101
  As the doctrine 
of unconstitutional conditions makes clear, the Constitution constrains to 
 
(2014) (stating that the usual rule is to construe a federal cause of action “to incorporate a 
requirement of proximate causation”).  Alternative theories of tort law and causation could 
provide a basis that would meet Article III requirements.  See, e.g., John Gardner, What is 
Tort Law For? Part 1: The Place of Corrective Justice, 30 LAW & PHIL. 1, 11 (2011) (“[B]e 
it corrective or be it distributive, an injustice perpetrated by anyone is in principle everyone’s 
business, and anyone at all has reason to help in securing its avoidance[.]”).  See also Cass 
Sunstein, What’s Standing after Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. 
L. REV. 163, 214 (1992) (“Neither English nor American practice supports the view that 
stranger suits are unconstitutionally impermissible.”). 
101 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that the 
federal government is bound to follow the same Equal Protection Clause as the states).  There 
is no consensus on whether constitutional provisions other than Article III—and, after 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), the Suspension Clause—limit Congress’s power 
to regulate federal jurisdiction.  See Fallon, Jr., supra note 25, at 1053 (“Because 
Boumediene’s ruling rested wholly on the Suspension Clause, it has no necessary bearing on 
jurisdiction-stripping proposals outside the scope of that provision.”).  Nevertheless, a few 
arguments recur in the literature and give credibility to the view that congressional authority 
is subject to constitutional constraint under provisions that are external to Article III.  Justice 
Scalia, for example, has argued that Congress’s power to regulate federal jurisdiction is 
subject to the structural provisions of Article II; the Constitution’s commitment to Presidential 
authority thus constrains Congress from establishing citizen-suit procedures that delegate the 
Executive’s “take care” power to a private party, and an enforcement action brought under 
such suit lacks subject-matter jurisdiction unless the individual has suffered her own concrete 
injury.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.”); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (“To permit 
Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers’ compliance with 
the law into an ‘individual right’ vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer 
from the President to the courts the Chief Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to 
take care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Separation of Powers, and Standing, 59 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 1023, 1049 (2009) (“Supreme Court doctrine on the scope of congressional power to 
influence standing in federal court is not a model of clarity.  No Justice has suggested that 
Congress lacks any power in this regard, and even cases like Lujan suggest that Congress may 
statutorily bless injuries to provide standing where those injuries would not have been 
recognized at common law.  But beyond those generalities, the level of congressional 
authority to authorize departures from the private rights model is not clear.”) (citation 
omitted).  
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some extent even those government acts that the government is not 
required to take, for example, “whenever government conditions a benefit 
it is not obligated to provide on waiver of a constitutional right.”
102
 
 
i. Equal Protection 
Turning first to equal protection, no doubt it is unusual to argue that 
a statute regulating federal jurisdiction raises equality concerns.  Jackson 
involves no claim of invidious motive and implicates no suspect class; an 
equality challenge to its classification of claimants may seem like an up-
hill battle.  The American doctrine of equality is notoriously thin, 
permitting the government to draw statutory classifications that are 
rational, with the core inquiry focused on whether the categories are 
sufficiently consistent as “to treat like cases alike.”
103
  Indeed, the 
government’s interest in administrative convenience can justify 
classifications that might otherwise fail under higher forms of scrutiny.
104
  
Waiving immunity to permit tort suits only by Sabbath observers would 
seem to be impermissible; waiving immunity in suits challenging 
 
102 Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in 
Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 8 (2001).  The unconstitutional conditions doctrine is a 
murky area of law.  See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 1413, 1415 (1989) (referring to “confusion” in the application of the doctrine); cf. Adam 
B. Cox & Adam M. Samaha, Unconstitutional Conditions Questions Everywhere: The 
Implications of Exit and Sorting for Constitutional Law and Theory, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 61, 
65 (2013) (“[A]n amusing aspect of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is that there is no 
doctrine.  At least there is no snappy and established test for analyzing unconstitutional 
conditions questions.”).  See generally Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem 
of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1304 (1984) (observing that 
the unconstitutional-conditions cases can manifest an inconsistency so “marked to make a 
legal realist of almost any reader”). 
103 Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008) (“Our equal protection 
jurisprudence has typically been concerned with governmental classifications that ‘affect 
some groups of citizens differently than others.’”) (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 
420, 425 (1961)); South v. South Carolina, 474 U.S. 888, 890 (1985) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (“This Court's refusal to treat like cases alike can only add to the unconstitutionally 
arbitrary nature of the death penalty.”).  For a discussion of the substantive content, if any, of 
American equality doctrine, see Christopher J. Peters, Equality Revisited, 110 HARV. L. REV. 
1210, 1212 (1997) (arguing for prescriptive equal protection that is nontautological and has 
substantive logical content); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 
(1982); see also Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 751 
(2011) (making the “descriptive claim that the Court has shut doors in its equality 
jurisprudence in the name of pluralism anxiety and opened doors in its liberty jurisprudence 
to compensate”).   
104 See, e.g., Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984) (upholding gender classification 
for administrative reasons).  
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restrictions on Sabbath observance to permit only injunctive relief could 
be permissible.
105
  But claims of equality are not limited to members of 
suspect classes; although the circumstance is unusual, the Supreme Court 
has held that “[t]he clause protects class-of-one plaintiffs victimized by 
the ‘wholly arbitrary act.’”
106
  Moreover, despite the infrequent nature of 
an equality challenge to an immunity-waiver, the argument carries a 
distinguished pedigree.  One significant reading of United States v. 
Klein—the only case in constitutional history in which the Court both 
invalidated Congress’s regulation of jurisdiction and also recognized that 
an immunity-waiver is subject to some constitutional constraint—
associates the decision with a principle of non-discrimination that goes to 
the core of equal protection.
107
  Under this principle, Congress may not 
open the courthouse doors to one class of litigants and close it to those 
who are similarly situated.
108
  As William W. Van Alystyne has explained, 
“Even a privilege, benefit, opportunity, or public advantage may not be 
granted to some but withheld from others where the basis of classification 
and difference in treatment is arbitrary.”
109
 
 
 
105 See Fallon, supra note 25, at 1067 (discussing the applicability of suspect-class 
analysis to jurisdiction-stripping statutes); see also Lloyd C. Anderson, Congressional 
Control over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: A New Threat to James Madison’s 
Compromise, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 417 (2000–2001) (discussing congressional control over 
jurisdiction and remedies).  For a discussion of the power of federal courts to remedy 
jurisdiction statutes that exclude claims or litigants, see Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts 
on Judicial Authority to Repair Unconstitutional Legislation, 28 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 301 
(1979) (discussing judicial power to extend under-inclusive statutes) and Mark V. Tushnet & 
Jennifer Jaff, Why the Debate over Congress’ Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Federal 
Courts Is Unending, 72 GEO. L.J. 11, 1322 (1984) (stating that Congress “has plenary 
authority to structure remedies”).    
106 Ind. Teachers Ass’n v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 101 F.3d 1179, 1181–82 (7th Cir. 1996).  
But see Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 598 (2008) (exempting public 
personnel decisions from class-of-one equality challenges under the Fourteenth Amendment).  
107 Meltzer, supra note 28, at 2549 (“Klein should not be discarded as a badly-reasoned 
relic with no contemporary significance.  For the Court’s decision continues to stand for 
something general and important—that whatever the breadth of Congress’s power to regulate 
federal court jurisdiction, it may not exercise that power in a way that requires a federal court 
to act unconstitutionally.”); Gordon G. Young, supra note 3, at 1230 (suggesting that Klein 
took “an antidiscrimination position on sovereign immunity”).    
108 Ind. Teachers Ass’n, 101 F.3d at 1181–82.  But see Engquist, 553 U.S. at 598 
(exempting public personnel decisions from class-of-one equality challenges under the 
Fourteenth Amendment).  
109 See William W. Van Alystyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in 
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1454 (1968). 
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The facts of Klein are well known and need not be rehearsed in 
detail.
110
  Klein involved efforts under the Abandoned and Captured 
Property Act of 1863 to recover proceeds from the sale of property that 
had been seized by Union soldiers during the Civil War.
111
  Only those 
who were loyal to the Union could recover property, and the question was 
how to distinguish rebels from those who merely resided or did business 
within the states of the Confederacy.
112
  The Court had held in United 
States v. Padelford that a presidential pardon was proof of loyalty to the 
Union.
113
  In response, Congress, by the Act of July 12, 1870, conferred 
original jurisdiction on the claims court and appellate jurisdiction on the 
Supreme Court, authorizing the judiciary to dismiss any claim or to 
reverse any judgment when proof of loyalty was based upon a 
presidential pardon.
114
  The Court in Klein held that the statute was 
unconstitutional.
115
 
The precise grounds of the Klein decision have been called 
everything from “enigmatic” to “deeply puzzling.”
116
  In one of the 
narrower readings of the decision, commentary focuses on the statute’s 
disregard of equal protection: Congress erected an arbitrary distinction 
between persons who sought to recover property—as Gordon G. Young 
explains it—“open[ing] the courts to truly innocent plaintiffs while 
closing them to those whose innocence comes by way of a pardon.”
117
  
Applying this reading to Jackson, we might argue that having consented 
to suit in federal court, the government is not free to open the courts to 
injured persons to whom the government chooses to give notice and to 
 
110 See Amanda L. Tyler, The Story of Klein: The Scope of Congress’s Authority to Shape 
the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 87 (Vicki C. Jackson & 
Judith Resnik eds., 2010). 
111 The Abandoned and Captured Property Collection Act, ch. 120, § 3, 12 Stat. 820 
(1863). 
112 See Gordon G. Young, supra note 3, at 1198 (stating that under the Act, those who 
had never given aid or comfort to the rebellion could recover). 
113 United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1869). 
114 Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 18 Stat. 230 (1870). 
115 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 148, (1871). 
116 See Vladeck, Why Klein (Still) Matters, supra note 85, at 251 (calling Klein 
“enigmatic” and “intriguing”); Howard M. Wassserman, The Irrepressible Myth of Klein, 79 
U. CIN. L. REV. 53, 53–55 (2010) (reporting that Klein has been called “deeply puzzling,” 
“disjointed,” “delphic,” and “generally difficult to follow”).  
117 Gordon G. Young, supra note 3, at 1230. 
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close the courts to those to whom it does not so choose. 
The FTCA requires the agency to send notice to all claimants that a 
claim has been denied; that notice announces to the claimant that the time 
for filing a federal lawsuit to challenge the denial has started to run.  To 
achieve the statutory goal, the agency must send the denial-letter by 
certified or registered mail, which provides evidence of receipt, and 
regulations state that the notice may go to the claimant, her attorney, or 
her representative.
118
  In Jackson, the agency sent the denial by certified 
mail to the claimant’s lawyer, and when that letter was returned as 
undeliverable, took no steps to notify the claimant of the denial despite 
the fact that her name and contact information were in the file.
119
  By 
effect, the government irrationally constructed two categories of 
claimants:  those claimants who received notice of their denial, and those 
claimants who are known by the agency not to have received notice, even 
though their contact information is in the file, and on this basis are 
blocked from filing their federal lawsuits on time.  Although the litigants 
are similarly situated, those in the second group are cut-off at the starting 
gate from obtaining judicial relief on the merits of their claims.
120
 
Described in this way, the classification results from the agency’s 
own conduct—its failure to provide a required notice—and carries a 
family resemblance to the classification invalidated in Logan v. 
Zimmerman Brush.
121
  Logan involved the question of whether the 
Fourteenth Amendment barred a state agency from dismissing an 
administrative claim as out-of-time and so without jurisdiction when the 
agency had failed to schedule an essential conference within the 
 
118 See 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (2012) (referring to the agency’s mailing, by certified or 
registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented); 
28 C.F.R. § 14.9 (2015) (mailing of notice to the claimant, counsel, or representative).  
119 The government argued that it would be an ethical violation to contact a claimant who 
was known to have representation.  Jackson v. United States, 751 F.3d 712, 718 n.3 (2014) 
(citing Def. Br. at 22 n.1).  But see Ann McGuire, The Quality of Mercy is Not Strained: 
Interpreting the Notice Requirement of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1034, 
1048 (1999) (rejecting this argument on the ground that ethical rules permit for direct contact 
with represented parties when permitted by law). 
120 Even assuming the problem in Jackson is anomalous, and it is not, the Supreme Court 
has recognized the possibility—admittedly controversial—of a “class-of-one” theory for 
equal protection analysis.  See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000).  But see 
William D. Araiza, Flunking the Class-of-One/Failing Equal Protection, 55 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 435, 438 (2013) (stating that the Court [in Olech] appeared to think the matter was 
uncontroversial).  
121 Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 438–39 (1982). 
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allowable time.
122
  Claims filed within the statutory period were given 
“full consideration on the merits,” but the plaintiff’s claim—filed late 
because of the agency’s error—was “unceremoniously, and finally, 
terminated.”
123
  The state appeals court rejected the federal equal-
protection and due-process challenges, and refused to permit a second 
filing, on the view that deviating from the legislative procedures would 
“frustrate the public interest in an expeditious resolution of disputes;” the 
Supreme Court reversed, finding a violation of due process and not 
reaching the equality claim.
124
  Justice Powell, concurring in the 
judgment, and joined by Justice Rehnquist, addressed the equal-
protection claim, and held that even under the weakest form of scrutiny, 
the state impermissibly had created two classifications of claimants: those 
with claims that were timely scheduled by the agency, and those that were 
not, with the former being accorded full consideration on the merits and 
the latter summarily dismissed.
125
  “Under this classification,” the 
concurrence explained, “claimants with identical claims, despite equal 
diligence in presenting them, would be treated differently.”
126
  The 
concurring opinion found that the classification did not promote the 
state’s interest “in the timely disposition of claims,” and that it would be 
“unfair and irrational” to punish the claimant; Justice Powell urged the 
common sense solution of administrative tolling for this “isolated 
example of bureaucratic oversight.”
127
  A plurality opinion by Justice 
Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and O’Connor, also 
found an equal-protection problem, and while acknowledging that the 
challenged classification was  “an unconventional one,” characterized it 
as “the very essence of arbitrary state action:” “the State converts 
similarly situated claims into dissimilarly situated ones, and then uses this 
distinction as the basis for its classification.”
128
 
 
 
122 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Logan, 455 U.S. at 424 (“The issue in this case is 
whether a State may terminate a complainant's cause of action because a state official, for 
reasons beyond the complainant's control, failed to comply with a statutorily mandated 
procedure.”).   
123 Logan, 455 U.S. at 438–39. 
124 Id. at 428. 
125 Id. at 443. 
126 Id.  
127 Id. at 443–44. 
128 Id. at 438–42.  
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So in Jackson, the agency withheld notice from the plaintiff, 
knowing how to contact her and fully aware that notice to her lawyer had 
been returned by the mail service as undeliverable.  It then used that 
disparate treatment as the basis for the federal court’s dismissal of the 
plaintiff’s belated claim, even though the plaintiff had no way of knowing 
that the agency had denied her claim and that the filing period had begun 
to run.  Admittedly, the statute has an escape-hatch permitting claimants 
to file suit when the agency has unjustifiably delayed in resolving the 
claim; but that procedure does not excuse the government’s failure to 
provide notice at the required time.
129
  It would run counter to the goals of 
administrative exhaustion to require litigants to file suit before they know 
whether they are even dissatisfied with the agency’s resolution; invoking 
judicial resources involves both private and public costs.  Moreover, as 
demonstrated by Jackson’s situation, the claimant cannot accurately 
predict whether her filing meets the statutory deadline.  To the extent that 
administrative exhaustion is intended to encourage expeditious resolution 
of claims without judicial involvement, the classification at play in 
Jackson cannot be said to promote a plausible government interest.  
Congress could not directly sort claimants by withholding notice from 
some, but not from others; similarly it may not indirectly rely on so 
arbitrary a process by attaching it as a condition to an immunity-waiver. 
 
ii. Due Process 
The lack of notice in Jackson raises the additional question of 
whether the government’s conduct satisfied due process.
130
  As the 
Supreme Court explained over a hundred years ago, due process “is a 
restraint on the legislative as well as the executive and judicial powers of 
the government, and cannot be construed to leave congress free to make 
‘any due process of law,’ by its mere will.”
131
  Congress cannot consent 
to jurisdiction on condition that a party must forfeit her rights to 
procedural protection or that the court ignore the requirements of the Due 
Process Clause.  That due process applies to the challenged action under 
the Fifth Amendment cannot seriously be disputed.  Due process protects 
property, although it does not create property, and the Court has 
 
129 See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (2012). 
130 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 210 (6th ed. 2012) (“[C]ongress 
cannot restrict jurisdiction in a manner that would deny due process of law”).  
131 Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276 (1856). 
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recognized that a cause of action is a “species of property protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,” with the same rule 
applicable to the Fifth Amendment.
132
  Justice Blackmun explained in 
Logan: 
This conclusion is hardly a novel one.  The Court traditionally has held that the 
Due Process Clauses protect civil litigants who seek recourse in the courts, either 
as defendants hoping to protect their property or as plaintiffs attempting to redress 
grievances.  In Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 78 S.Ct. 1087, 2 
L.Ed.2d 1255 (1958), for example—where a plaintiff’s claim had been dismissed 
for failure to comply with a trial court’s order—the Court read the ‘property’ 
component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to impose 
‘constitutional limitations upon the power of courts, even in aid of their own valid 
processes, to dismiss an action without affording a party the opportunity for a 
hearing on the merits of his cause.’
133
 
As in Logan, the plaintiff’s right to access federal relief was “more than 
an abstract desire or interest in redressing . . . [a] grievance,” but rather, 
was established by the federal statute.
134
  The fact that the claim in Jackson 
was asserted under the FTCA does not change the property analysis; 
although there is a species of public right that Congress may alter at will, 
the FTCA does not create causes of action; rather it extends jurisdiction 
over causes of action that exist at common law and would expose the 
United States to liability, but for the cloak of sovereign immunity.
135
 
The question then is what process is due.  In Jackson, the 
government triggered a jurisdictional time-period by sending a notice of 
denial by certified mail to the claimant’s counsel with no follow-up when 
the letter was returned as undeliverable even though the case file 
contained the claimant’s address (as well as the lawyer’s phone number 
and email).
136
  Due process does not require perfect procedures; the 
 
132 See Logan, 455 U.S. at 428; Timothy P. Terrell, Causes of Action as Property: Logan 
v. Zimmerman Brush Co. and the “Government-as-Monopolist” Theory of the Due Process 
Clause, 31 EMORY L.J. 491, 508 (1982) (arguing a tort cause of action is property for 
constitutional purposes even in “the absence of transferability”); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (“Equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as 
that under the Fourteenth Amendment[.]”).   
133 Logan, 455 U.S. at 429.  
134 Id. at 431. 
135 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2012); Richard E. Levy & Sidney A. Shapiro, Government 
Benefits and the Rule of Law: Toward a Standards-based Theory of Judicial Review, 58 
ADMIN. L. REV. 499, 507 (2006) (“[S]ince the federal government may not be sued without 
its consent, a litigant is entitled to sue in federal court claiming rights created by an act of 
Congress only if that or another law consents to such suit”) (quoting RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 
SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 75 (3d ed. 
1999)). 
136 At a minimum, Logan would suggest that it is impermissible to trigger a limitations 
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standard is flexible and context-specific.
137
  However, the Court has 
repeatedly emphasized the importance of the government’s providing 
adequate and timely notice before depriving an individual of her property, 
and if the individual’s whereabouts are known, such notice must be actual 
and not constructive.
138
  Above all, as explained in Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., the method of providing notice must be “such 
as one desirous of actually informing . . . might reasonably adopt to 
accomplish it.”
139
 
In its 2006 decision in Jones v. Flowers, the Court addressed an 
analogous situation in which a state agency sent a notice by certified mail 
to a delinquent taxpayer advising of an upcoming tax sale, the agency 
took no follow-up steps when the letter was returned as undeliverable, the 
property was sold at a sheriff’s auction, and the taxpayer sued to recover 
his property.
140
  The Court held that the state had violated the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, even though the state did not know 
the taxpayer’s current address because the taxpayer had failed to update 
his file. Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that the government’s failure 
to try to contact the taxpayer a second time violated even the flexible 
standard announced by Mullane: 
We do not think that a person who actually desired to inform a real property 
owner of an impending tax sale of a house he owns would do nothing when a 
certified letter sent to the owner is returned unclaimed.  If the Commissioner 
prepared a stack of letters to mail to delinquent taxpayers, handed them to the 
 
period based on an act that the government did not take—in Jackson, actually notifying the 
claimant that the claim had been denied.  Logan, 455 U.S. at 434–35 (“A system or procedure 
that deprives persons of their claims in a random manner . . . necessarily presents an 
unjustifiably high risk that meritorious claims will be terminated. And the State’s interest in 
refusing Logan’s procedural request is, on this record, insubstantial.”).  Numerous courts of 
appeal have held that an administrative forfeiture proceeding is void when the party with an 
interest in the forfeited property “failed to receive constitutionally adequate notice.”  See, e.g., 
Kandonsky v. United States, 216 F.3d 499, 503 (5th Cir. 2000).  In some circuits, the 
claimant’s remedy for inadequate notice is restoration of the right “to seek a hearing in the 
district court.”  Boero v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 111 F.3d 301, 304–07 (2d Cir. 1997); 
see also United States v. Dusenbery, 201 F.3d 763, 768 (6th Cir. 2000), aff'd on other grounds, 
534 U.S. 161 (2002) (stating that “inadequate notices should be treated as voidable, not void, 
and that the proper remedy is simply to restore the right . . . to judicially contest the forfeiture).  
137 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 429 U.S. 319 (1976) (setting forth a balancing test that is 
context specific). 
138 See Tulsa Prof’l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 484 (1988) (“[S]tate 
action affecting property must generally be accompanied by notification of that action[.]”) 
139 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950) (interpreting 
the Fourteenth Amendment).  
140 Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 229 (2006). 
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postman, and then watched as the departing postman accidentally dropped the 
letters down a storm drain, one would certainly expect the Commissioner’s office 
to prepare a new stack of letters and send them again.  No one “desirous of 
actually informing” the owners would simply shrug his shoulders as the letters 
disappeared and say “I tried.”  Failure to follow up would be unreasonable, 
despite the fact that the letters were reasonably calculated to reach their intended 
recipients when delivered to the postman.
141
 
Likewise, in Jackson, when the agency saw that its certified letter to the 
claimant’s counsel was returned as undeliverable, its employees could 
not constitutionally “simply shrug” their shoulders and take no further 
action, when follow-up contact information was easily available from the 
case file.
142
  Chief Justice Roberts specifically rejected the view, set forth 
in Justice Thomas’ dissent, that due process takes account only 
information that the government has “before it calculated how best to 
provide notice,” and not after; although “the failure of notice in a specific 
case does not establish the inadequacy of the attempted notice,” 
knowledge that notice provided in the usual course turned out to be 
ineffective “was one of the ‘practicalities and peculiarities of the case’” 
that could trigger “an obligation on the government’s part to take 
additional steps to effect notice.”
143
 
In Jackson, the “practicalities” of the case highlight the arbitrary 
quality of the agency’s failure.  The FTCA requires the agency to provide 
notice by certified or registered mail; that method of notice ensures that 
the agency receives confirmation that the claimant or her proxy actually 
has received the notice that was mailed.  The requirement of certified or 
registered mail is not simply a technical formality that leaves the agency 
free to do nothing when a letter is returned.
144
  Moreover, in Jackson, the 
agency did not even need to search a phone book to locate the claimant—
her address was in the case file, yet the court of appeals assumed that 
having the agency take any additional steps would be an undue 
administrative burden.
145
  In addition, regulations specify that the agency 
 
141 Id. 
142 Jackson v. United States, 751 F.3d 712, 717 (6th Cir. 2014).  
143 Jones, 547 U.S. at 230–31 (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314–15). 
144 See Bermann, supra note 7, at 579 (“One reason the potential for misunderstanding 
and confusion concerning the final denial has not materialized is that the FTCA requires 
agencies to issue final denials in the form of certified or registered mail.  Justice Department 
regulations additionally require an express warning to dissatisfied claimants that they must 
bring suit, if at all, within six months of the date of mailing.  Until claimants receive such a 
communication, they can safely assume that their claim has not been finally denied and that 
the statute of limitations has not yet begun to run.”) (citations omitted). 
145 Jackson, 751 F.3d at 718. 
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may give notice to the claimant or her counsel or representative.  
Presumably if notice cannot be given to counsel, notice can be attempted 
directly to the claimant, an argument that the court of appeals considered 
but rejected without raising or addressing any due-process concerns.
146
 
Instead, the court of appeals sidestepped the constitutional question, 
and—insisting that the  immunity-waiver must be strictly enforced—
suggested that the absence of notice resulted from the failure of  the 
plaintiff and her lawyer to notify the agency of the lawyer’s change in 
address and of the substitution of counsel.
147
  Even if this account fairly 
reflected the record—and it does not—the legal argument has no 
constitutional significance.
148
  In Jones, Chief Justice Roberts rejected the 
argument that a claimant who fails to up-date his address “forfeits his 
right to constitutionally sufficient notice.”
149
  To the contrary, the majority 
emphasized that the claimant’s action does not excuse the government’s 
constitutional failure or “alter the unreasonableness of the . . . position 
that . . . [the agency] must do nothing more when the notice is promptly 
returned ‘unclaimed.’”
150
 
Finally, it might be argued that the source of the agency’s obligation 
in Jones v. Flowers to take follow-up steps was derived from the 
Arkansas statute, governing the sale or forfeiture of real property to be 
sold for taxes, and not the requirements of due process.
151
  That statute 
specifically provides: 
If the notice by certified mail is returned undelivered for any other reason, the 
Commissioner of State Lands shall send a second notice to the owner or interested 
party at any additional address reasonably identifiable through the examination 
of the real property records properly filed and recorded in the office of the county 
 
146 See id. at 718; 28 C.F.R. § 14.9 (2015). 
147 Jackson, 753 F.3d at 717–18. 
148 The claimant’s representative, a lawyer associated with a well-regarded law firm, took 
the reasonable step of informing the United States Postal Services of a change of address, and 
when the forwarding order expired, used “runners” to pick up mail from the post office.  
Runners apparently were necessitated by systemic problems in the mail-delivery service in 
Detroit.  See Chris Christoff, Abandoned Dogs Roam Detroit, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 21, 
2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-21/abandoned-dogs-roam-detroit-in-
packs-as-humans-dwindle.html (reporting mail delivery halted in some Detroit 
neighborhoods); Lisa M. Collins, Delivery in Doubt, METRO TIMES (Feb. 12, 2003), 
http://www.metrotimes.com/detroit/delivery-in-doubt/Content?oid=2175537 (reporting 
systemic problems of mail delivery).  
149 Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 232 (2006). 
150 Id. at 232.  
151 Id.  
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recorder where the property is located . . . .
152
 
By contrast, the FTCA does not prescribe a second-notice requirement, 
so arguably an FTCA claimant’s procedural rights are limited to those set 
forth in the statute.  This view informed the court of appeals’ conclusion 
that an FTCA claimant has a right only to the procedures attached to the 
government’s immunity-waiver.
153
  The court ignored the federal 
agency’s regulation that contemplated the possibility of notice to the 
claimant or to the lawyer, and likewise did not consider the functional 
significance of requiring the agency to use certified or registered mail as 
the method of notification.  More importantly, the appeals court assumed, 
incorrectly, that Congress may create a substantive interest but subject it 
to fewer procedural protections than the Fifth Amendment requires.
154
  As 
the Supreme Court explained in Logan, 
While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest . . . it may not 
constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, 
without appropriate procedural safeguard . . . . [T]he adequacy of statutory 
procedures for deprivation of a statutorily created property interest must be 
analyzed in constitutional terms.
155
 
When a substantive right—such as a cause of action or federal 
jurisdiction—is “inextricably intertwined” with a statute’s procedural 
protections, a litigant cannot be compelled “to take the bitter with the 
sweet.”
156
  Congress may be free to withhold jurisdiction over tort claims 
against the United States, but once it waives immunity, it cannot 
condition access to a court on procedures that violate due process, for the 
validity of the procedure is determined by the Constitution, not by 
legislative grace.  Justice White has explained: 
[I]t is settled that the ‘bitter with the sweet’ approach misconceives the 
constitutional guarantee.  If a clearer holding is needed, we provide it today.  The 
point is straightforward: the Due Process Clause provides that certain substantive 
rights—life, liberty, and property—cannot be deprived except pursuant to 
constitutionally adequate procedures.  The categories of substance and procedure 
are distinct.  Were the rule otherwise, the Clause would be reduced to a mere 
tautology. “Property” cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its 
 
152 ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-37-301(a)(4) (2011). 
153 Jackson v. United States, 751 F.3d 712, 717–18 (6th Cir. 2014) (sending a notice 
would have been the “preferred” course, but was not the “required” course, and the 
government’s waiver must be read strictly in favor of the United States). 
154 Id. 
155 Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432 (1982) (alteration in original; 
quotation marks omitted) (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 490–491 (1980)) (quoting 
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167 (1974) (opinion concurring in part)). 
156 Arnett, 416 U.S. at 152–154 (explaining the “bitter with the sweet” argument, set out 
in the plurality that was specifically rejected by the other six Justices). 
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deprivation any more than can life or liberty.  The right to due process “is 
conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee.  While the 
legislature may elect not to confer a property interest  . . . it may not 
constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, 
without appropriate procedural safeguards.”
157
 
The Due Process Clause does not protect against every deprivation 
of property.  In particular, certain unintended losses that are caused by 
negligent acts by government employees fall outside its scope.
158
  But the 
plaintiff in Jackson was not subject to a random act, akin to “leaving a 
pillow on the prison stairs, or mislaying an inmate’s property”; to the 
contrary, the agency made the deliberate decision not to take follow-up 
steps even though it knew that its earlier notice had been returned.
159
  In 
just this circumstance, the Due Process Clause is intended to provide 
“procedural safeguards” that protect an individual not only against the 
loss of property, but also from what Dean Edward L. Rubin has called 
“bureaucratic oppression”—“action by administrative agents that impose 
unnecessary and harmful burdens on private parties.”
160
  That these 
actions are associated with a waiver of sovereign immunity ought not to 
shield them from judicial review. 
 
iii. Judicial Independence 
So far the discussion has examined the constitutionality of the 
government’s practice from the perspective of the individual litigant. But 
the problem in Jackson goes beyond infringing the rights of the individual 
litigant.  The government did not simply use an unfair or arbitrary process 
to extinguish the claimant’s cause of action; rather, the government used 
such a process to foreclose relief, and then conscripted the federal court 
to ratify the validity of that result.  In effect, the court in Jackson could 
take jurisdiction in the plaintiff’s suit only to dismiss her claim, thereby 
allowing the government to extinguish a property interest despite the 
absence of notice and in circumvention of constitutional limits.  Even 
more, by invoking the immunity-waiver as the grounds for the decision, 
 
157 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1984) (citing Arnett, 416 
U.S. at 167) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
158 The Supreme Court, 1985 Term—Leading Cases: Negligent Deprivation, 100 HARV. 
L. REV. 144, 150 (1986) (“The due process clause is meant to address deliberate state 
decisions.”). 
159 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986). 
160 Edward L. Rubin, Bureaucratic Oppression: Its Causes and Cures, 90 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 291, 299 (2012).  
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Congress was able to make it seem as if its treatment of the plaintiff was 
permissible, even though it was impermissible under the Fifth 
Amendment.  To borrow from Lawrence G. Sager, the government’s 
action violated the first principle of Klein: the United States “direct[ed] 
the court to be instrumental to [an impermissible] end,” using its 
immunity-waiver to validate claimant’s loss of property rights despite the 
absence of fair and equal process.
161
 
Professor Martin H. Redish and Christopher R. Pudelski have 
argued that the Klein principle is violated whenever Congress enlists the 
court in what the authors call legislative “micro deception.”
162
  Micro 
deception occurs when Congress “leaves the generalized substantive law 
intact, but legislatively directs that a particular litigation (or a group of 
litigations) arising under that law be resolved in a manner inconsistent 
with the dictates of that pre-existing generalized law.”
163
  Other 
commentators link the Klein principle with the related requirement of 
decisional independence, postulating that Congress cannot use the 
vesting of jurisdiction or an immunity-waiver to compel the Article III 
courts to “speak a constitutional untruth.”
164
  In other words, an Article III 
problem is presented whenever Congress uses its waiver of sovereign 
immunity to obscure a “micro deception” that makes it seem that the 
government is committed to a legal rule when in fact it is relying on the 
court’s exercise of federal jurisdiction to camouflage that it is not.  As 
Howard M. Wasserman discusses, drawing from the Redish and Pudelski 
approach, “Congress cannot cook procedural and evidentiary rules to 
achieve desired substantive outcomes without fully changing and 
 
161 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 148 (1871); see Samuel Estreicher & 
Margaret H. Lemos, The Section 5 Mystique, Morrison, and the Future of Federal 
Antidiscrimination Law, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 109, 128 (2000); Sager, Klein’s First Principle: 
A Proposed Solution, supra note 19, at 2531 (Klein’s first principle is that “the judiciary will 
resist efforts to make it seem to support and regularize that with which it in fact disagrees.”). 
162 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).  
163 Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. Pudelski, Legislative Deception, Separation of 
Powers, and the Democratic Process: Harnessing the Political Theory of United States v. 
Klein, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 439 (2006).  
164 Meltzer, supra note 28, at 2540; see Sager, Klein’s First Principle: A Proposed 
Solution, supra note 19, at 2529 (“This is how we should understand the first principle of 
United States v. Klein: The judiciary will not allow itself to be made to speak and act against 
its own best judgment on matters within its competence which have great consequence for 
our political community.  The judiciary will not permit its articulate authority to be subverted 
to serve ends antagonistic to its actual judgment; the judiciary will resist efforts to make it 
seem to support and regularize that with which it in fact disagrees.”).  
HELEN HERSHKOFF.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/3/2015  3:47 PM 
2015] WAIVERS OF IMMUNITY 277 
publicly acknowledging the state of substantive law.”
165
 
The situation in Jackson presents a variant on that theme.  The 
FTCA creates a legal rule that commits the United States to the principle 
of government accountability and to the goal of providing fair 
compensation for individuals who are injured by the negligent actions of 
federal agencies and officers.  However, the no-notice procedure used in 
Jackson suggests that the government’s commitment is a sham – a “micro 
deception.”
166
  The United States has made it seem as if the FTCA lifts its 
immunity, when in fact the government remains cloaked in immunity 
because the agency blocks the claimant’s filing of a lawsuit by 
withholding timely notice of the agency’s denial of its claim.  As in Klein, 
the United States in Jackson conscripted the federal court in this 
deception; the court believed it was compelled to dismiss even legitimate 
claims for reasons unrelated to the merits.  It is just this sort of “micro 
deception”—requiring individual cases to be resolved “in a manner that 
is inconsistent with controlling law”—that forms the core of the Article 
III problem.
167
 
Saying that a waiver of immunity must respect judicial 
independence to decide a case does not require a broad understanding of 
Article III or of the federal court’s role as expositor of constitutional 
meaning; nor does the argument assume that a federal court must actively 
search a pending case for constitutional problems, even in the absence of 
jurisdiction.
168
  Rather, the argument builds on the basic obligation of a 
court to determine whether it has jurisdiction.
169
  The appeals court in 
Jackson clearly recognized this obligation when it undertook de novo 
review of the district court’s decision regarding jurisdiction, and so 
examined plaintiff’s compliance with the requirement of timely filing, 
which the court treated as a jurisdictional component of the immunity-
waiver.
170
  However, the court failed to consider whether the conditions 
 
165 Wasserman, The Irrepressible Myth of Klein, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 53, 90 (2010).  
166 Id.    
167 Redish & Pudelski, supra note 163, at 439. 
168 Cf. Fallon, supra note 25, at 1062 (offering but questioning a reading of Boumediene 
v. Bush in which the Court treats “the judicial branch’s function of saying what the law is as 
a ground for holding that the Constitution mandates federal jurisdiction”). 
169 Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126, 127 (1804) (“Here it was the duty of 
the Court to see that they had jurisdiction, for the consent of parties could not give it.”). 
170 See Jonathan Remy Nash, On the Efficient Deployment of Rules and Standards to 
Define Federal Jurisdiction, 65 VAND. L. REV. 509, 530 (2012) (stating that “district court 
decisions regarding subject matter jurisdiction are reviewed de novo”). 
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attached to that waiver were themselves constitutionally suspect, a 
question clearly within the appellate court’s reviewing power.
171
  
Although the boundaries of the doctrine are not clear, courts have some 
residuum of jurisdiction to determine whether they have jurisdiction.
172
  
Thus, even if the plaintiff in Jackson had not raised a jurisdictional 
objection in the proceedings below, the appeals court had the power and 
a duty to raise the issue sua sponte; an entailment of the jurisdictional 
inquiry concerns whether Congress may bar federal jurisdiction through 
a procedure that infringes on constitutional guarantees.
173
 
 
 
 
 
 
171 See Michael T. Morley, Avoiding Adversarial Adjudication, 41 FL. STATE U.L. REV. 
291, 299 (2014) (“Courts generally are not required to consider waived or forfeited arguments, 
unless they concern the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction or the justiciability of the case.”) 
(citations omitted).  Moreover, plaintiff argued below that an undelivered letter did not trigger 
the jurisdictional time-period, and so the issue, even if it were not jurisdictional, was not 
forfeited.  See Jackson v. United States, 751 F.3d 712, 717–18 (6th Cir. 2014). 
172 See Battaglia v. Gen. Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 
335 U.S. 887 (1948) (jurisdiction-stripping provision did not block court from determining 
whether statute deprived rights in violation of the Fifth Amendment); see also United States 
v. California, 932 F.2d 1346, 1347–48 (9th Cir. 1991), aff’d on other grounds, 507 U.S. 746 
(1993) (”[A[n appellate court may review an issue “neglected below if the issue is purely one 
of law and the pertinent record has been fully developed, . . . [or] when there are significant 
questions of general impact”).  See generally Kevin M. Clermont, Sequencing the Issues for 
Judicial Decisionmaking: Limitations from Jurisdictional Primacy and Intrasuit Preclusion, 
63 FLA. L. REV. 301, 316–18 (2011) (citing Dan B. Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing 
the Issue of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Before Final Judgment, 51 MINN. L. REV. 491, 494–
99 (1967)) (observing that doctrine accepts as a bootstrap principle the rule that a court 
without jurisdiction has power to determine whether it has jurisdiction). 
173 Although the argument has fallen out of favor, an analogy might be drawn to the 
constitutional-fact doctrine developed in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), which 
requires an Article III court to review de novo findings of fact as well as conclusions of law 
that pertain to constitutional rights.  The alternative, the Supreme Court explained, would be 
“to sap the judicial power as it exists under the federal Constitution, and to establish a 
government of a bureaucratic character alien to our system, wherever fundamental rights 
depend, as not infrequently they do depend, upon the facts, and finality as to facts becomes in 
effect finality in law.”  Id. at 57; see Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 
COLUM. L. REV. 229, 258 (1985) (stating that “I would be startled to see the Court decide that 
a litigant pressing a bona fide constitutional claim could be denied access to the independent 
judgment of a judicial forum.  Nevertheless, I confess considerable uncertainty over whether 
the Constitution generally mandates any specific level of independent judicial factfinding”). 
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IV. NIT-PICKING TECHNICALITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL 
 AVOIDANCE, AND STATUTORY HOUSEKEEPING 
It could be that Jackson is what Justice Powell might call—as he did 
in Logan—“an isolated example of bureaucratic oversight”—precisely 
the “sort of negligence . . . to toll the statutory period” for filing suit.
174
  
Or it could be that many letters of denial are returned, and the 
administrative system for reviewing tort claims requires serious revision 
and overhaul.  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals did not engage that 
question, and the United States does not publish statistics about the 
number of FTCA denial-letters returned to the investigating agencies as 
undeliverable.  By reading the timely filing requirement as mandatory 
and jurisdictional, the appeals court declined to take the sensible 
approach of equitably tolling plaintiff’s claim and instead cast procedural 
blame on the plaintiff and her lawyers.  This Part makes two additional 
points: (1) in future litigation, the United States ought to interpret its 
waiver of immunity as requiring actual and timely notice to claimants; 
and (2) in the spirit of “statutory housekeeping,” Congress ought to 
clarify the terms of the FTCA waiver to prevent the recurrence of the 
arbitrary injustice of the Jackson case.
175
  This Part addresses each of these 
points in turn. 
 
A. Constitutional Avoidance 
The doctrine of constitutional avoidance holds that “where an 
otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious 
constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such 
problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of 
Congress.”
176
  The doctrine traditionally has been defended as a principle 
of constitutional restraint that enables the judiciary to avoid unnecessary 
friction with the political branches, recognizing the exceptional nature of 
judicial review in a system that depends on majoritarian decision-
 
174 Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 443 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring). 
175 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Peter W. Huber, The Intercircuit Committee, 100 HARV. 
L. REV. 1417, 1421 (1987) (recommending “statutory housekeeping” to resolve problems and 
conflicts in statutory interpretation). 
176 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 
568, 575 (1988) (citation omitted); see also Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 
348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“[W]hen the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn 
in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle 
that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by 
which the question may be avoided”). 
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making.
177
  Critics question whether the doctrine in fact promotes judicial 
restraint; in practice, the canon may enable courts to displace legislative 
policies with judicial preferences in cases that are not constitutionally 
warranted.
178
  Others see the doctrine’s normative value in terms of a 
“resistance norm,” that is—“a rule designed to push interpretation in 
directions that reflect enduring public values,” and those values stem 
from constitutional provisions including Article III and the Due Process 
Clause.
179
  The avoidance doctrine ought not to apply when it would 
produce “a futile result, or an unreasonable result inconsistent with the 
purpose of the statute.”
180
 
Here, the FTCA comfortably supports a reading that the time period 
for filing suit cannot commence until the certified or registered receipt 
confirming that the claimant actually received the denial-notice has been 
returned to the agency.  Otherwise the use of certified or registered mail 
is mere surplusage and makes no sense—use of regular postal service 
would have been sufficient if mailing, without an assurance of the 
claimant’s receipt, is all that Congress required.  This reading of the 
statute avoids a constitutional difficulty for it aligns congressional intent 
with the requirements of due process.  Congress enacted the FTCA to 
provide a waiver of immunity of the most “sweeping” sort; the decision 
to amend the statute in 1966 and to mandate administrative exhaustion 
was intended to obviate the need for litigation by ensuring an early and 
informal process that could investigate and attempt to settle the claim, not 
to curtail access to federal courts.
181
  It was recognized that delay of 
payment, which litigation inevitably involved, could be harmful to 
individuals who had already suffered because of the government’s 
negligent misconduct.  At the same time, Congress made clear that those 
who were dissatisfied with the agency’s disposition—in many cases, 
claimants who believed that discovery would enable them to make a 
better case for damages—could proceed to federal court in an orderly 
 
177 See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 238 (1998) (explaining that 
the canon “seeks to minimize disagreement between the branches by preserving congressional 
enactments that might otherwise founder on constitutional objections”). 
178 Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 74 (1995). 
179 Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation 
of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1551 (2000). 
180 William M. Wiecek, The Debut of Modern Constitutional Procedure, 26 REV. LITIG. 
641, 653 (2007). 
181 Robert E. Lewis, Litigation under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 27 TEX. L. REV. 807, 
807 (1949).  
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way, and were to be given notice of their procedural rights.
182
  The 
administrative procedures that Congress set out, and the Office of the 
Attorney General elaborated upon in its regulations, were designed to 
facilitate an easy disposition of claims, not to create “snarls” or proverbial 
traps for the unwary.
183
 
Over the years, a misplaced focus on strictly construing the 
government’s waiver has transformed these claims-processing rules into 
“nit-picking” jurisdictional requirements, so that deviation from the 
prescribed rules now forms the basis for dismissing a claim.  Although 
some commentators criticize the avoidance doctrine as being subversive 
of legislative prerogative, its application here would promote, not 
undermine, congressional intent; it would serve as a variant of the 
“resistance norm” described by Ernest A. Young—“rules that raise 
obstacles to particular governmental actions without barring those actions 
entirely”—by screening out unconstitutional glosses that have been 
imposed on the statute notwithstanding congressional purpose.
184
  At the 
same time, use of the avoidance doctrine would promote judicial 
independence by preventing the courts from being conscripted into 
ratifying unconstitutional acts of the other branches.
185
 
It is not unusual for courts to use an avoidance principle when 
assessing the constitutionality of statutes regulating federal jurisdiction.  
A classic example is Webster v. Doe, a suit by a former CIA employee 
challenging his termination.  The government moved to dismiss for lack 
of subject-matter jurisdiction on the ground that judicial review was 
barred by the authorizing statute.
186
  The Court read the statute to ensure 
access to at least one judicial forum for constitutional claims, even if 
jurisdiction did not exist under the statute for non-constitutional claims.
187
  
 
182 See generally Bermann, supra note 7, at 579 (describing 1966 amendments). 
183 The Federal Tort Claims Act, 56 YALE L.J. 534, 540 (1947) (discussing aspects of the 
FTCA that could potentially entangle unwary claimants in intricate legal snarls).   
184 See Ernest A. Young, supra note 179, at 1551; see also Gilliam E. Metzger & Trevor 
W. Morrison, The Presumption of Constitutionality and the Individual Mandate, 81 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1715, 1719 (2013) (“[T]he modern avoidance canon is a tool of both statutory 
construction and constitutional implementation.  Indeed, it renders statutory construction a 
mode of constitutional implementation.”). 
185 See generally Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Does Avoiding Constitutional Questions Promote 
Judicial Independence?, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1031 (2006) (discussing the relationship 
between avoidance techniques and judicial independence). 
186 Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988). 
187 Id.  
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Webster reflects a typical application of the avoidance doctrine when a 
congressional statute purports to oust the courts of jurisdiction to hear 
constitutional claims.  In many of these cases, the argument that Article 
III or the Due Process Clause mandates a federal forum faces “formidable 
objection,” yet there is sufficient constitutional uncertainty to warrant 
avoidance of the constitutional question or to counsel in favor of 
protecting a constitutional norm through statutory interpretation.
188
  The 
constitutional defect in withholding timely notice is straightforward.  By 
acknowledging that the FTCA requires meaningful, and not meaningless, 
notice, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance would support the norm 
of equality and due process while opening up a pathway for the judicial 
resolution of tort claims on their merits.  This article invites the United 
States to embrace this reading of the statute in its future defensive 
litigation. 
 
B. Statutory Housekeeping 
Finally, this article urges Congress and the Office of the Attorney 
General to undertake what Justice Ginsburg has characterized in an 
analogous context as “statutory housekeeping,” and to clarify that the 
claims-processing rules of the FTCA are not jurisdictional.
189
  The FTCA 
currently is codified in scattered provisions of the Part 28 of the United 
States Code, and although the jurisdictional provisions are segregated 
from those dealing with the administrative process, it appears that 
additional clarification is needed to underscore that these latter provisions 
are not freighted with jurisdictional significance but rather are affirmative 
defenses that go to the merits and may be waived or equitably tolled.
190
  A 
generation ago, the Governance Institute aimed to increase 
communication between Congress and the courts to improve statutory 
drafting; the aim was to establish a mechanism for informing law makers 
“about how appellate courts interpret the legislative product,” so that 
technical defects, such as errors in grammar, infelicitous phrasing, or 
verbal gaps and “glitches,” did not produce unintended and unfortunate 
 
188 Ernest A. Young, supra note 179, at 1585–89. 
189 Ginsburg & Huber, supra note 175, at 1428; see also Henry J. Friendly, The Gap in 
Lawmaking—Judges Who Can’t and Legislators Who Won’t, 63 COL. L. REV. 787, 794 (1963) 
(discussing problems of legislative drafting).  
190 See Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, Title IV, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (current version 
codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. §1346(b) (jurisdiction conferred); § 2401(b) 
(jurisdiction exclusions); & §§ 2671–2680 (administrative exhaustion)). 
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legal consequences.
191
  Conceptually, the project’s goal was to “promote 
understanding” among the different branches of government, again with 
the practical aim of enhancing the judiciary’s ability to interpret 
legislation and leading to more effective governance.
192
  The project 
involved a feedback mechanism: appellate courts would “transmit 
opinions that point out possible technical problems in statutes to Congress 
for its information and for whatever action it wishes to take.”
193
  The 
proposal eventually acquired institutional form, attracted the 
participation of many appeals courts, and drew praise from legislators for 
invigorating inter-branch communication.
194
 
In a similar spirit, in previous writing I have urged that Congress 
look to dismissed FTCA cases as a source of information about agency 
performance and the possible need for regulatory reforms.
195
  Jackson 
provides Congress with important feedback on how agencies process 
federal-tort claims and offers insight about how claims-processors 
apprehend their statutory and constitutional role—reflecting a serious 
misunderstanding of the duty to provide meaningful notice when a claim 
is denied.
196
  Further, Jackson underscores the importance of having 
Congress review statutory language in the light of judicial canons, so that 
courts can faithfully apply our nation’s laws consistent with 
congressional goals.
197
 
 
191 Robert A. Katzmann & Russell R. Wheeler, A Mechanism for “Statutory 
Housekeeping”: Appellate Courts Working with Congress, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 131, 
131 (2007); see Robert A. Katzmann & Russell R. Wheeler, Interbranch Communication: A 
Note on “Article III En Banc,” 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 110, 112 (2007). 
192 See Robert A. Katzmann, Statutes, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 637, 682–83 (2012). 
193 Katzmann & Wheeler, Interbranch Communication: A Note on “Article III En Banc,”, 
supra note 191, at 111; see also Frank Burk, Statutory Housekeeping: A Senate Perspective, 
85 GEO. L.J. 2217, 2218 (1997) (discussing the voluntary nature of congressional-committee 
participation). 
194 Katzmann, supra note 191, at 687–93 (discussing the “virtues” of the project and its 
positive effects on governance). 
195 See Helen Hershkoff, Early Warnings, Thirteenth Chimes: Dismissed Federal-Tort 
Suits, Public Accountability, and Congressional Oversight, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1 
(forthcoming Winter 2015). 
196 Jackson v. United States, 751 F.3d 712 (6th Cir. 2014). 
197 Thirty years ago, the Administrative Conference of the United States examined agency 
procedure under the FTCA and suggested a package of reforms that it believed would protect 
against unreasonable interpretation and application of rules, promote efficient claim-
processing, and encourage fairness to claimants.  Some of those reforms were never 
implemented, and it is timely to do so.  Drawing from the work of the Administrative 
Conference, George M. Bermann identified specific changes to the claims-processing rules 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Commentators invoke the word “dysfunction” to describe a great 
deal of current government activity, although the causes and cures of that 
dysfunction are contested.
198
  Mark A. Graber writes, “Constitutional 
dysfunctions occur when constitutional purposes, constitutional 
institutions, and the constitutional culture are misaligned or 
disharmonic.”
199
  Jackson offers a small window into the large problem 
of dysfunction: the misalignment of the ancient principle of sovereign 
immunity, if there even was such an ancient principle, with the 
democratic principle of government accountability.  No one entrusted 
with power should think it reasonable to treat a letter returned to an 
agency as affording the meaningful and timely notice that an individual 
needs to enforce rights against the government; the fact that the 
conditions are attached to a waiver of immunity—intended to secure 
accountability—exacerbates rather than blunts the problem.
200
  If this 
article motivates Congress, the courts, and government lawyers to rethink 
their approach in FTCA cases, then it will have succeeded in modestly 
realigning constitutional values with public action. 
 
 
that warrant fresh consideration.  See Bermann, supra note 7, at 579. 
198 See Sotorios A. Barber, On Political and Constitutional Dysfunction, 94 B.U. L. REV. 
603, 609 (2014) (“[C]onstitutional reform is remotely likely in the United States, at least not 
until some calamity forces it upon the nation”); Nancy L. Rosenblum, Governing Beyond 
Imagination: The “World Historical” Sources of Democratic Dysfunction, 94 B.U. L. REV. 
649, 649 (2014) (“Democratic dysfunction is no illusion.”). 
199 Mark A. Graber, Belling the Partisan Cats: Preliminary Thoughts on Identifying and 
Mending a Dysfunctional Constitutional Order, 94 B.U. L. REV. 611, 620 (2014).  
200 See Lawson, supra note 2, at 206 (arguing that certain forms of jurisdiction-regulation, 
unless subject to constitutional limit, would allow Congress to dictate the outcome of the case 
and would permit Congress to be the judge in its own cause).  
